I would like to thank our current hosts at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs for the opportunity to bring together the concerns of that paper with the concern for root causes that underlie this workshop. The task set for me by the organizers of this workshop is to focus on the root causes of state terrorism and violations of human rights. After this initial session all the other presentations for this workshop will focus on terrorism used by those who oppose the state. My purpose therefore will be to explore what we can learn from the use of terrorism by states as we consider the problem of the root causes of terrorism by those who oppose states.
In the list of questions suggested for our attention I hope to address two basic sets:
Are there some root causes or fundamental processes that are common to all (or most) forms of terrorism?
What role does the weakness or strength of the state play in state terrorism?
There is now a substantial body of case study literature which has documented the use of repression and terrorism by states against their own populations. Most of these studies concentrate on the most egregious violators of human rights and the most terroristic of states. There is thus a substantial body of literature on the use of state terror by the Communist Eastern European regimes of the twentieth century, the Nazis, the state terror of the Southern Cone and Central American right wing regimes of the 60s and 70s and the "fragile states" of Africa and Asia in the post independence era. There is also a growing body of research involving cross national quantitative measures of state violence, repression and terror, which rather than focusing on the particulars of any one case seeks patterns and theoretical causes across the cases. Both types of studies have contributed much to our knowledge of the very wide range of characteristics, dimensions and horrors of state behavior. What is clear is that state terrorism has been practiced by states which are rich and poor, revolutionary and reactionary, expansionist and reclusive, secular and religious, east and west, north and south. In short virtually all types of states have at some time engaged in or promoted behaviors which many would characterize as terrorism either within their own borders or in the wider international system. Given this diversity, it is not surprising that no clear single factor derived from a structural characteristic related to state terrorism has emerged. Or put another way, if we were to consider the various structural characteristics of states, there are very few analytic cells which would remain empty of the experience of state terrorism. Given the increasing ability of people to move across national boundaries and the increasing interconnectedness of states and peoples across those boundaries, there are few states that may be confident that they will experience first hand none of the conflicts that arise in their neighbors or even in distant states or be simply threatened from afar by them. Under such circumstances how will they react and how will they respond?
In this paper, after an initial definitional and conceptual discussion, I introduce an expected utility approach to explore the conditions under which states have resorted to the use of violence, repression and terrorism against their own and other's populations to detect the conditions that resulted in these behaviors and explore different forms of state terrorist behavior in both domestic and international affairs.
My intention is not to equate all state and non-state actors who employ terrorism in pursuit of political goals, nor is it to condemn such actors out of hand (though I would consistently deplore their choice of terrorism as a tactic or strategy) but rather to seek to understand the conditions (or in the words of the organizers the root causes) under which state terrorism occurs and thus provide new insight into the conditions under which terrorism emerges as a political tactic or strategy and to contribute to the discussion of the "root causes" that are the focus of this workshop.
Before discussing the conditions under which governments choose to employ strategies and tactics which involve violence and terrorism it is useful to clarify how these concepts will be employed. The basic conceptual/theoretical principle with which I begin is that terrorism is intentional behavior. As such, its explanation and prediction lie primarily with models of intentional or purposive behavior.
With minor modification I follow the pre1984 United States Department of State definition of terrorism:
The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to influence a target group wider than the immediate victim or victims (U.S. Department of State, 1983) .
To make the intentionality more clear, I would simply add the term purposeful and thus consider terrorism as:
The purposeful threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to influence the victim and or a target group wider than the immediate victim or victims.
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Following Bissell et. al., repression is considered as "the use of coercion or the threat of coercion against opponents or potential opponents in order to prevent or weaken their capability to oppose the authorities and their policies." This definition enables the recognition of the denial of rights (including the rights to food, shelter and security which are often characterized in terms of structural violence are different, but no less meaningful than physical acts). Violence is defined in accordance with the liberal tradition as an act of physical harm.
An important key to the understanding of how terrorism differs from "ordinary" political violence is to recognize that in terrorism the act or the threat of the act of violence is but the first step. Terror is purposeful behavior designed to influence targets beyond the moment of victimization and/or beyond the direct victims of the violent act. It is a conscious strategy or tactic of influence and not merely violent acts which cause death and destruction. The violence that is terrorism seeks to influence the behaviors of others, not merely to eliminate victims.
Thus, following the insights of Thomas Schelling (1966:16-17) , the position taken throughout this presentation is that whether the terrorism undertaken by governments "saves lives or wastes them…" whether punitive coercive violence is uglier than straightforward military force or more civilized ;" whether terror is more or less humane than military destruction;" we need to consider that the actions that are being described are concerned with the manipulation of violence and in Schelling's words "the threat of pain and the promise of more." As such, I would contend that such acts are properly defined as terrorism and are therefore quite simply unacceptable behavior regardless of the actor.
An expected utility approach provides useful insights into the process of understanding why a government might choose terrorism as a tactic or strategy. In previous work (Duvall and Stohl 1983) , Raymond Duvall and I argued that that an expected utility model is useful for understanding a government's choice of terrorism as a tactic or strategy in domestic affairs and in a later work (Stohl, 1986) I argued that it could be applied to state behaviors in the international realm as well. Such an approach calculates the benefit thought possible from the desired out come, the believed probability with which the action will bring about the desired state of affairs and the believed probable cost of engaging in the action. This approach does not require the analyst to believe that the actor who chooses to employ terrorism is a fanatic; merely that he is a "rational actor" who has calculated that a terrorist action is to his advantage.
The argument is that if all other things (and most relevantly according to the argument, expected costs) are equal, a regime is more likely to employ terrorism as a means of governance when it believes that terrorism is more effective relative to other means of governance. This approach locates terrorism as a strategy of action in a conflict situation. State terrorism within the domestic context presupposes a regime in conflict with at least some of its citizenry. Almost certainly, this means eliminating, quieting, or mitigating an actual or perceived potential challenge or threat on the part of some identifiable segment of the citizenry to the structure, personnel, or policies of the regime. If terrorism is calculated as a relatively more effective means of governance, then, the government must estimate that terrorism will perform better than alternative means in eliminating or quieting some actual or perceived potential challenge or threat. Within the international realm, the same logic applies.
States (and other terrorist actors) might choose terrorism paradoxically both when they perceive themselves powerless--the sense that other policy instruments of rule are unavailable or less useful--and when they were in a situation that may be labeled confident strength--when the costs were perceived as low and the probability of success believed high in relation to other means (Duvall and Stohl, 1983) The Situation of Powerlessness Much discussion of terrorism begins with the assertion terrorism is a weapon of the weak. The image is of a group so unable to engage successfully in political conflict through "conventional" means that it adopts terrorism as a last resort out of frustration and a sense of powerlessness. Whether or not this imagery is generally apt, it does contain an important lesson for the student of state terrorism. That is, a government may be "driven" to the use of terror as a means of rule out of a sense of relative hopelessness in attempting to meet the (actual or perceived potential) threat through alternative means of governance. The believed relative effectiveness of terrorism in this situation depends less on the perception of terror as highly efficacious than it does on the sense that other means of rule are quite inefficacious.
A sense of relative ineffectiveness of conventional means of rule depends on two factors: an inability of the regime to mobilize and employ the positive and negative inducements on which those means rely; and/or the nonreceptivity of target groups to those inducements. A simple expectation is that the first of these factors is apt to be greatest where the regime is able to command relatively few resources and where it has relatively limited means (particularly organizational apparatus) to deliver those few resources it can command; that is to say, in the context of new, weak, fragile states. An equally simple expectation is that the second factorthe non-receptivity of target groupsdepends overwhelmingly on the vulnerability of the group to the manipulation of positive and negative inducements by the government. Groups are less vulnerable, and hence less receptive to conventional means of governance, where they are a large proportion of the population or where they are strongly and zealously committed to the values about which they are in conflict with the regime, particularly if they are an elusive social group. This is because it is difficult for the government to buy off, co-opt , make compromises with, directly repress, or engage in physical military combat with either a large proportion of its citizenry or a deeply committed, highly zealous, generally elusive adversary group. Taken together, these considerations lead us to expect that a sense of relative governmental powerlessness potentially conducive to terrorism can occur in two closely related but distinct syndromes. One is the new fragile state in which the government perceives itself challenged or threatened by large portions of the society it is attempting to rule. The second is the new fragile state in (actual or perceived potential) conflict with a strongly committed, elusive adversary group. In both syndromes, moreover, one would expect whatever state terrorism occurs to be both intense and socially pervasive. This is due, in the one instance, to the large size of the target population, and, in the other instance, to the strength of commitment and elusiveness of the target. In either case, a great deal of terror would be required to be effective.
In sum, one path, in two distinct forms, that conduces to state terrorism of an especially intense and socially pervasive kind is the path of perceived powerlessness on the part of the regimethe sense that other means of governance are relatively less useful, indeed sometimes to the point of believed futility, in waging the conflict with societal challenges. The two distinct forms of this path correspond quite closely to the empirical patterns found in the immediately post revolutionary Second World experience, on the one hand, and in the contemporary Third World experience of the government going after an amorphous, ill-defined political "enemy" on the other hand. One, the post revolutionary Second World, was the model of a new, fragile state in conflict with substantial portions of the population who were felt to be resisting the revolutionary transformation of society. The other, contemporary Third World regimes in conflict with an "enemy" is the model of a fragile state facing multiple political challenges, often representing potentially significant ethnic and or religious cleavages.
The Situation of Confident Strength
A failing of much of the analysis of political terrorism is the implicit presumption that it is only the weapon of the weak. But it most certainly is not. Beliefs about the relative expected effectiveness of terrorism do not depend solely on a sense of inefficacy for alternative strategies of action. On the contrary, some political actors, including some governments, estimate that terrorism can and will itself be highly effective. In this situation, terrorism can be adopted out of a position of confidence and strength.
Again, the estimation of relative effectiveness depends on the two factors identified above: ability to command relevant resources; and receptivity, or vulnerability, of the target group. But here the factors are essentially reversed from their positions in defining a situation of powerlessness. Now we are talking about a government's belief that it can command, mobilize, and employ the resources necessary to wage a campaign of terror (whether or not it can mobilize resources for conventional means of governance), and its belief that the target will be vulnerable and receptive to such a campaign (again, regardless of the groups vulnerability to other positive and negative inducements). This entails an estimation of both the extent to which the target is vulnerable to terror or to pressure or influence by some intermediary terrorized population, and the extent to which the actor is able to control or manage the processes of terrorizing and of translating the terror into desired action by the target and/or the intermediary population. The more vulnerable the target is believed to be and the more the government feels itself able to control the process, the greater the believed probability of effectiveness of terrorism.
Our simple expectation is that three considerations are most relevant to a determination of these two subjective factors. The first is a process of learning, by which we mean simply that believed probabilities are greater as terrorism has been judged to have been successful in past conflict situations. Learning can be based on either an actor's own past or reports of others' pasts. The former is apt to have strong impact, and leads to the obvious point that the more successfully a government has made use of terrorism as a means of rule in the past, the higher the expected ut ility it is apt to attach to terrorism for current conflicts. The other form of learning is an imitation principle. It is not apt to have as strong an impact, but nevertheless it acts to encourage the use of terrorism by a government to the extent that it is aware of successful terrorism in other regimes. As it becomes public knowledge that some governments have used or are using terrorism successfully to rule, the more common will state terrorism likely become. The converse also follows.
The second consideration is especially relevant to a government's beliefs about its ability to administer terror and to control the process of terrorism. Although this ability includes a technological component Does the government possess the means to target violence?we believe that its primary basis is of an organizational nature. That is, it rests on the extent to which the government has penetrated or has the means to penetrate the informational and politically relevant sectors of society. If a government maintains, or is capable of implementing, an extensive network of penetration of society, its decision makers are apt to believe themselves able to manage, with some fairly high probability of success, the process of terror. Governments that are most likely to satisfy this condition are those which are highly developed and maintain large bureaucratic establishments.
The third and perhaps most important consideration has to do with the features of the target population; features which increase its vulnerability to state terror. The most relevant of these would seem to be a lack of integration of the target group into the dominant social fabric. Socially marginal groups, without strong ties to and support from the mainstream of society, are especially vulnerable to victimization and, concomitantly, terror. Societies in which there is significant ethnic cleavage with political power concentrated within rather than across ethnic lines are equally likely to produce what are considered by those in power to be social marginal groups.
Taken together, these considerations lead us to expect that a situation of felt confidence and strength potentially conducive to terrorism on the part of the regime can occur in a particular syndrome. This is the syndrome of the polity with highly developed informational and organizational networks through which the regime penetrates society, and in which the government perceives itself in actual or potential conflict with some socially marginal group that is poorly integrated into (or "disoriented" with respect to) the rest of society. In this syndrome, one would expect state terror to be limited in scope and generally of fairly low intensity, sufficient only to "win" the conflict with the marginal social group. When the socially marginalized group is large and easily identifiable, terror is likely to be intense because of the scale of the potential opposition. At the same time, one would expect terror in this situation to be used more regularly and perhaps with greater intensity by governments who have learned its utility for rule through past experience.
The Expected Relative Costs of Terrorism
Certainly terrorism is not used to the same degree by all governments which find themselves either in a position of relative powerlessness to govern effectively through alternative means, or which believe themselves able effectively to employ terrorism as a means to govern socially marginal groups. There is considerable variance, even within these kinds of situations. That variance is due in part to the subjective probabilities of relative effectiveness of various means of governance. But beliefs about relative effectiveness are only part of the picture. They set situations conducive to the use of terrorism. But they are not sufficient to explain its actual occurrence.
Also necessary are the government's expectations about the costs it would have to bear in using terrorism relative to the costs of alternative means of governance. Two kinds of costs, response costs and productions costs, can be distinguished. Response costs are those costs which might be imposed by the target group and/or sympathetic or offended bystanders. The bystanders may include domestic and foreign audiences and the target audience may be wider than the attacking party may have intended when choosing the victims and the actions.
Production costs are the costs of taking the action regardless of the reactions of others. In addition to the economic costs--paying the participants, buying the weapons and the like, there is the psychological cost of behaving in a manner which most individuals would, under normal conditions, characterize as unacceptable behavior.
Following Ted Gurr (1986:62-67) we may identify three sets of conditions that affect the decision making calculus of threatened elites: Situational conditions: include the political traits of challenges (the status and strategies of challengers) and the elites own political resources for countering those challenges (regime strength and police apparatus). Structural conditions: those that define elites' relations with their opponents and determine or constrain their response options. These include the state's position in the international system and the nature of social stratification and the elite's position within it. Dispositional variables: conditions that can be expected to influence how elites regard the acceptability of strategies of violence and terrorism. Norms supporting the use of violence are shaped by elites' direct or mediated experience with violent means of power and are inhibited by democratic values
Response Costs
When governments consider various means of governance, they are attentive to the expected responses of others. What others likely will do in reaction affects the utility of a particular strategy. Most relevant to a consideration of terrorism are what might be called punitive or retributive costs imposed by the target group and/or sympathetic or offended bystanders. State terrorists, as do insurgent terrorists, therefore consider how to make themselves relatively invulnerable to response. There are at least two means to this end. One is inaccessibility. Retaliators may know in general, or even in particular, who the terrorist is but be unable to locate him. The anonymity of refugee camps or urban areas, and physical mobility across national boundaries may provide this inaccessibility for insurgent terrorists. But governments and governmental decision makers are not, in general, inaccessible in these terms, except to the extent that they can completely insulate themselves from retaliation, and to the degree that they are immune to international pressure. States with fewer ties to potential interveners, those without significant international "importance (lack of strategic geographic significance, important natural resources), important international constituencies (émigré's, sponsors etc.) and a lack of openness and democratic structures are likely to be more invulnerable than other types of states.
States and some insurgents also rely on a second means of invulnerability, that is, secrecy of action. State terrorism can often be expected to be covert action, because in this way the government effectively reduces its vulnerability to retaliation even below its vulnerability to the (otherwise lesser) response costs expected for other means of governance. This means that, in general, state terrorism will not have "publicity of its cause" as an objective. Also, it means that as public accessibility to governmental officials is greater, and/or as regime vulnerability to international pressure is greater, terrorism is more likely to be secretive, and, concomitantly, is less likely to be as extensive.
Thus state terrorism appears to be greatest in reclusive states. Regime vulnerability, either to domestic retribution or to international pressure, is generally less important in such regimes and thus response costs are relatively low.
In addition, these considerations about response costs help to explain the ways in which state terrorism is carried out in relatively more vulnerable regimes. The terrorism itself is often targeted at socially marginal groups who are not expected to have many politically powerful sympathetic friends able to impose very high punitive costs on the government. The agents of the terror are likely to be clandestine, i.e. the secret police or its equivalent or parastatal vigilante squads, thereby reducing the extent to which the regime can be held directly accountable.
Production Costs
This is the cost simply of taking the action regardless of the reactions of others. For terrorist action, which is not apt to be terribly expensive to undertake, this is most importantly a self-imposed cost. It takes the form of normative or moral constraint on action. Because this type of cost is less tangible, it is frequently overlooked. But it is quite important to an analysis of terrorism in that it may be quite high. That is because whatever moral/normative constraints have been internalized regarding the use of violence in general are supplemented by the fact that terrorism entails a special kind of violence. The victims of terrorist violence are incidental and instrumental. They are not, in general, the direct or particular objects of intense animosity. Thus something other than hatred must operate to break down whatever prohibitions have been internalized against the use of violence.
The psychological costs that an actor can expect from perpetrating violence on an incidental, instrumental, victim involve the extent to which the victim can be or has been dehumanized in the mind of the violent actor. Where victims can be viewed in other than human terms, the self-imposed costs of terrorist actions are apt to be low and hence the choice of terrorist actions more frequent.
The extent to which victims and potential victims can be dehumanized is affected by two important variables (for an extended discussion of this point see the seminal piece by Herbert Kelman, 1973) . The first is the perceived social distance between the government and the victim population. The second is the extent to which action is routinely and bureaucratically authorized, so that personal responsibility is perceived, by all actors in the decisional chain, to be avoided. These production costs for terrorist action are apt to be lower for governments (a) in a conflict situation with those they define as "inferior," or those that have initiated or protected those that have committed terrorist actions against them or on their soil and/or (b) and when policymakers can justify their actions to themselves as acting "in and for the best interests of the state and not as individuals.
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For international relations scholars working within the realist tradition this is familiar ground. For realists states reside within an international system which is akin to the Hobbesian state of nature, with both lacking "a political authority sufficiently powerful to assure people security and the means to have a felicitous life (Beitz, 1979:21) ." Thus states have the right (and the responsibility in the realist tradition) to do what they must to preserve their existence and may expect other states to behave in the same manner. Charles Beitz argues that Hans Morgenthau, the leading realist scholar of the past half century, seems to claim that "a state's pursuit of its own interests justifies disregard for moral standards that would otherwise constrain its action (Beitz,1979:21) " and indeed, Morgenthau (1978:10) states that the state "has no right to let its moral disapprobation...get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival." For realists, it would thus appear that there are no limits to actions which may be taken on behalf of the state when it is the national security of the state which is actually at risk.
In a previous work (Stohl, 1986 ) I identified three broad forms of state terroristbehavior in the international sphere. Terrorism as a subset of coercive diplomacy constitutes the first. In Terrorist Coercive Diplomacy) the aim is to make non-compliance with a particular demand, in the words of Schelling (1966: p. 15 ) 'terrible beyond endurance'. While the threat is openly communicated by the actions of the state, the threat may be implicit and i s quite often non-verbal. Terrorist coercive diplomacy is overt behavior. The parties to the conflict are fully aware of the nature of the threat.
There are two types of covert state terrorism which constitute the second form of state terrorism: 1. clandestine state terrorism is a form of covert action which consists of direct participation by state agents in acts of terrorism. 2. State sponsored terrorism is a form of covert action which consists of state or private groups being employed to undertake terrorist actions on behalf of the sponsoring state.
The clandestine services of the national state are generally responsible for initiating, participating in, or coordinating these actions. Government agents operating across national boundaries may choose either national elites or the foreign society itself as the target. In this type of state terrorism, states may thus attempt to intimidate government officials directly through campaigns of bombing, attacks, assassinations and by sponsoring and participating in attempted coup d'état. Alternatively, national states participate in the destabilization of other societies with the purpose of creating chaos and the conditions for the collapse of governments, the weakening of the national state and changes in leadership. The threats to the regime and the society are obvious, but there is an attempt at deniability nonetheless. Both the pattern of such behavior and the threat of such a pattern being initiated constitute the terroristic aspect of this type of action.
The third broad form of state terrorism involves assistance to another state or insurgent organization which makes it possible or 'improves' the capability of that actor to practice terrorism either at home or abroad. This form is labeled surrogate terrorism as the obvious effect and intent of the assistance provided is the improvement of the assisted actor's ability either to carry out terrorist actions to maintain a regime's rule or to create chaos and/or the eventual overthrow of an identified enemy-state regime.
There are two subcategories of this form of terrorism. 1. State supported terrorism exists when third parties undertake actions on their own which are subsequently supported by the interested state. 2. State acquiescence to terrorism occurs when terrorism is undertaken by third parties and while not explicitly supported by the interested state, the actions are not condemned or openly opposed.
Terrorist Coercive Diplomacy
The defining characteristic of coercive diplomacy as distinct from both diplomacy and traditional military activity is that the force of coercive diplomacy is used:
in an exemplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments, to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict (George, 1971, p. 18 ).
We may speak of terrorism as a subset of coercive diplomacy when violence or its threatened use is present. Not all coercive diplomacy employs violence and thus not all coercive diplomacy is terrorism. For example, one may employ economic sanctions in an allowedly coercive manner, as did the members of the United Nations with respect to South Africa, without employing violent tactics. We will confine our analysis to the violence of coercive diplomacy whose central task has been described as 'how to create in the opponent the expectation of unacceptable costs of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing' (George, 1971, p. 26-27) .
We must recognize that by convention -and it must be emphasized only by convention -great power use and the threat of the use of force is normally described as coercive diplomacy and not as a form of terrorism. But if we return to the US Department of State definition of terrorism introduced earlier, it is quite clear that certain forms of coercive diplomacy involve the threat and often the use of violence for what would be described as terroristic purposes were it not great powers who were pursuing the very same tactic.
We should also recognize that states, particularly great powers, find it a much easier task to not only bring force to bear for threats but also to communicate their ability to do so. It is thus less necessary for a state actually to carry out its threat than it is for an insurgent terrorist organization which has to work much harder to demonstrate the credibility (in both dimensions of capability, i.e. is the actor both willing and able to employ the threat) of their threat to employ force.
Further we must also consider the question of innocents and noncombatants. When coercive diplomacy is in the nature of the traditional gunboat-diplomacy mode, when in principle gunboats face off against gunboats, we have what Schelling (1966, p. 3) described as brute force to overcome strength. However when the 'gunboat' is positioned so as to indicate the ability to strike at the civilian population and not a military target, we have what Schelling describes as the threat of pain to structure the opponent's motives. We should recognize that this inclusion of innocent noncombatants should not be considered to be any different in form from that of the insurgent terrorist who threatens to unleash a wave of bombings on city streets. When these innocents are citizens of non democratic societies who are not considered responsible in any conceivable sense for their government's legitimacy or actions, then coercive power which threatens these citizens to coerce their governments surely involves threats to helpless innocents and must be considered as a form of terrorism.
One may argue the virtues of such a state terrorist coercive strategies illustrate, 'achieving one's objectives economically, with little bloodshed, for fewer psychological and political costs, and often with much less risk of escalation' (George, 1971, p. 19) . Saving lives is indeed a virtue. This virtue, however, does not alter the fact that the strategy is based on terror and the power to destroy if 'proper' responses are not engendered by the threats and/or the relatively low levels of violence employed. Coercive strategies which rely on the threat of violence should therefore be considered state terror policies, regardless of whether or not they save lives or we approve of them (see Schelling, 1966:16-17) Covert State Terrorism Both the clandestine state terrorism and state-sponsored forms of covert state terrorism in international relations, unlike the coercive diplomacy discussed above, are usually aimed at producing, not compliance, but rather fear and chaos. In addition to the message that the act conveys about vulnerability and the assets (personal and material) that are destroyed, it is hoped that as a result of increased fear and chaos, governments at some later point will be in a weaker bargaining position or will be more willing to make concessions, given the costs that have become apparent. In relative terms, response and production costs are lower than for open coercive diplomacy. The attempt at deniability may create suspicions, but suspicions are generally less costly in the court of public opinion than are open admissions. It is also less expensive to mount most forms of covert operations than it is to 'send the fleet' or mobilize the resources necessary for a fully-open coercive operation. Further, if a covert operation fails the cost is likely to be less than that of the failure of an open coercive operation. Costs increase only as deniability and success become less possible and the various publics involved lessen their support and extract punishment for the failures and embarrassment. It is the threat of this type of behavior in general that serves to keep governments fearful of outside interference.
States also employ private clandestine agents and that there are differential response and production costs associated with the use of private clandestine agents. It should be noted that both the lines between these agents as statesponsored versus state-supported terrorists as well as that between the two and clandestine state terrorism, may be easily blurred in the absence of reliable information. However, it should be clear that the distinguishing analytic criteria are temporal -was approval or instigation for an action granted prior to the decision to undertake the act? -and organizational -are the actors members of the state's covert organization or are they acting on their behalf or being supported or after the fact? These analytically clear demarcations break down when agents purposefully outline acceptable goals and ambiguous limits to the means with a knowing wink and nod.
Surrogate Terrorism
The third form of state terrorism in international affairs, surrogate terrorism, involves assistance to another state or insurgent organization which makes it possible or 'improves' the capability of that actor to practice terrorism both at home and abroad. There are two forms of this type of terrorism. Statesupported terrorism occurs when third parties undertake actions on their own which are subsequently supported by the interested state. State acquiescence to terrorism is identified when third parties, although not explicitly supported by the interested state, conduct operations which are either quietly approved (because they contribute to state objectives) and/or are not condemned or openly opposed by the interested state. Surrogate terrorism requires even lower response and production costs than the previous forms of state terrorism, but it also provides much less control and by its nature is least likely to lead to benefits that may be calculated in advance. States having few options, or finding themselves in situations where direct actions -even if they have a reasonable chance of deniability -would still be extremely dangerous were they either to fail or be discovered, often find the surrogate choice acceptable if they believe there is a chance, at the very least, to raise the costs of their adversaries.
States as Surrogate Terrorists
Within the structures of dominance that exist in the international system, powerful states do not simply exert military force and threats to control all aspects of both the internal and external relations of subordinate states. I have already discussed the intervention of relatively powerful states in the affairs of the less powerful. Powerful states also aid the less-powerful states in their domestic and international affairs and these less-powerful states, in turn, assist the powerful to pursue their objectives. When states sell, grant and otherwise provide favorable terms by which their coalition partners, allies, client states (and at times neutrals and even adversaries) obtain equipment enabling their regimes to continue and/or expand practices of repression and terrorism I would argue that in such cases states are practicing a form of surrogate terrorism which at the very least may be considered as state acquiescence and when the terror serves purposes which have been discussed jointly spills over into state sponsorship. When the superpowers train the personnel that conducts the terror operations, consult with and advise (for 'reasons of state') the security services of 'friendly' states in their use of terrorism, this tool is a form of surrogate terrorism.
(b)
States as International Surrogates. As long ago as 1975 Brian Jenkins (1975 worried that nations might employ groups as surrogates for engaging in warfare with other nations. These surrogates (both state and non-state actors), he argued, might be employed: to provoke international incidents; to create alarm in an adversary; to destroy morale; to cause the diversion of an enemy's resources into security budgets; to effect specific forms of sabotage; to provoke repressive and reactive strategies and the revolutionary overthrow of targeted regimes (what we may designate that Marighela strategy as applied by state rather than insurgent actors, see Marighela, 1971 ).
We recognize that terrorism has become simpler for insurgents because of advances in transport, communications, weapons, technology and access to the media. We should also recognize that the vast resources of the state allow it to make far greater use of these developments than many individuals and insurgent groups and thus we must create the conditions under which states will find it too costly to choose a policy of terrorism.
CONCLUSION
The preceding pages argue that strategies and tactics of terrorism are considered and employed by states in both the domestic and international policy realms. As with the case of insurgents, the practice of state terror, when identified as such, brings almost universal condemnation. But when it is the state that is the perpetrator of the terrorist act few even pause to label the action as such. States and proponents of their actions shrink from labeling what they themselves or those they support do as 'terror', preferring more 'neutral' designations such as 'coercive diplomacy', 'assistance' to a friendly state in its pursuit of internal security or 'aid' to freedom fighters or wars of national liberation.
One final question brings us back to the beginning: If terrorism presupposes states within a conflict situation, what are the conditions then in which the expected utility model with its consideration of effectiveness and response and production costs produces empty cells, that is cells in which we terrorism does not appear as a chosen policy? As Gurr has argued, "The disposition to use state terror is most effectively constrained if elites hold democratic values and are checked by democratic institutions. The relationship is not coincidental or spurious. Democratic political norms emphasize compromise in conflict and participation and responsiveness in relations between rules and ruled, traits that are inconsistent with reliance on violence as an instrument of rule or opposition (Gurr 1986:58) .
The cases in the domestic realm in which stable democracies resort to repression or even clandestine acts of terror within their borders have almost all occurred during times of defined extremis or in specific regional crises, which while "explicable" go beyond what we expect the behavior of democracies to be, particularly when looking from a distance of either years or miles. While repressive behavior is the more likely extreme behavior, even some of these states have also used terrorism against their own citizens.
If the theoretical framework employed to guide this analysis is useful, the management of the problem of states and terrorism will come in increasing the response and production costs of terrorism as a possible strategy within domestic and foreign-policy repertoire of states. The first step in such a process is the delegitimation of the option. It is necessary to tear away at the protective clothing that allows agents of the state and the public to ignore the human consequences that state terrorist behavior generates. If we may delegitimize such behavior, we increase the psychic production costs for state decisionmakers. By challenging the behavior and raising public awareness both at home and abroad we increase the possibilities of bystanders of the terrorism challenging the behavior. This will contribute to an increase in the response costs that policy-makers will have to add to their decision calculus.
The raising of the issue will obviously be more effective in pluralistic Western societies than elsewhere in the international system. While these states are less likely to employ terrorist strategies within their own states, their acceptance of the international rules of the game has enabled engagement in terrorist strategies abroad and also to ignore, except in politically selected cases, terrorism by states and insurgents of which they approve.
Not all state-terrorist behaviors can be managed or countered in the same way and while all states can operate at levels equivalent to insurgents, it is quite often the case that the costs of doing so are larger than the expected benefits and thus they choose not to do so. It is our task to find useful procedures to increase the costs of terrorist operations across the board. Twenty years ago when my colleagues and I began scoring the Amnesty International and State Department reports on the five point scale concerned with states human rights behaviors the number of states that would receive scores of 1 or 2 was significantly lower than it is today. As the number of democracies has increased the opportunities for increased response and production costs for those that would choose terrorism also increases.
When looking across time and space at the varieties of states, the variance in circumstance and contending political and social groupings, the expected utility approach forces us to contend with the willingness of decision makers to use not simply violence instrumentally but victims instrumentally. By thinking about the processes and structures that constrain such behaviors, it is clear that calculations about not only the response of enemies but also of supporters are a key component in restraining the instrumental use of victims.
